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THE CREDIT SUPPORT SYSTEM IN THE POLISH AGRICULTURE. 
THE EVALUATION OF 10 YEARS PERFORMANCES 
 
 
Abstract. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the 10 years performance of the credit support system in 
the Polish agriculture. The analysis showed that during 10 years of the running the system about 10% 
of farms were its beneficiaries. The positive changes in agricultural sector took place but it is difficult 
to separate the credit assistance effects. The system has the advantageous influence on the creation of 
the sustainable financial system in the rural areas by helping cooperatives banks to overcome 
difficulties by generating stable farmers’ credit demand.  
 
Keywords: preferential credit, cooperative bank, credit market 
 
JEL classification: Q14  Q18 
 
Introduction 
   
In May 2004 Poland joined the European Union. It means involving in Common Agricultural 
Policy. The accession will result the end of agricultural preferential credit system, which has existed 
since 1994. It seems that the evaluation of outcomes of the system is necessary. It can help to 
understand dimensions of credit as a tool of intervention and to recognize constrains, advantages and 
disadvantages of it using. 
The analysis of results of credit interventionism starts with characteristics of the Polish 
agriculture and its role in the economy at the beginning of the transition. It is followed by the 
description of the first steps of credit intervention in agriculture. The next part is devoted to 
presentation of basic assumptions, formal aims, and elements of the credit preferential system. In the 
third part, the results of the 10 years its functioning is examined. To sum up the comparison losses and 
gains is given. 
  The examined period covers generally 10 years from 1994 to 2003. When data are available the 
year of 2004 is included to analyses.  The information and data are taken from different sources like 
The Central Statistical Office of Poland, The General Inspectorate of Banking Supervision, The 
Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture, the research of author, and relevant 
literature. The data used in paper illustrate the examined processes; show the scale of changes and 
their tendency. The mixed methods of analysis were used. The descriptive method with elements of 
comparative one is the main method. It is supported by statistic method.  
 
The Polish agriculture at the beginning of the transition, its characteristics and the role 
in the economy 
   
  In the communistic period the agriculture was important sector of the Polish economy (Table 1). 
Its share in GDP just before transition was more than 10%, its share in employment was much greater. 
About 40% population lived in rural areas and was connected with agriculture with many various 
kinds of links. The share of agriculture in total investment outlays as well as in export was not 
adequate to its share in GDP and employment.  
Table 1. The place of agriculture in the Polish economy at the beginning of transformation to market 
economy 
Specifications  1989  1993 
Population in rural areas (% of total)  38.4  38.2 
Persons employed in agriculture and hunting   (%)  26.4  25.7 
GDP in agriculture (%)  11.8  6.4   3 
Agricultural land area  (' 000 ha) 





Share  of  agriculture,  hunting,  forestry  in  total  investment 
outlays (%) 
14.1  6.8 
Share  of  live  animals,  animal  and  vegetable  products  in 
export (%) 
4.1  3.4 
Source: GUS, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 1991, 1994. 
 
The specific feature of the Polish agriculture was the presence of private sector. The private 
farms existed in parallel with state farms and cooperative farms. The role of private farms was the 
most important taking under consideration their share in agricultural land, employment, production. 
There were very many private farms but of rather small area, with agricultural land divided into many 
small plots. The farms were generally technically bad equipped; they had problems with buying 
working capital and fixed capital because of characteristic of communistic countries permanent 
shortage of goods, which is analyzed in famous works of Kornai (1980, 1982). As a consequence, 
farms’ productivity was small (Table 2) comparing with the results of farms in well developed market 
economies in Europe. These data indicate dimensions and the scale of problems connected with 
restructuring of agriculture, which the Polish economy faced at the beginning of transformation into 
market economy. But in contrary to the other communistic countries, a domination of private farms 
was a positive aspect of the Polish agriculture. Moreover, private farms were familiar with conducting 
operations at their own account and on own risk although the conditions of activity in central planned 
economy were different from conditions in market economy.  
Table 2. Trends and the major economic and production results in the Polish agriculture in the 1989 
and 1993 (only private farms) 
Specifications  1989  1993 
Private farms exceeding 1 ha of agricultural land  2,143,000  2,149,000 
Private farms by area groups (%)  100  100 
1.01 – 1.99  17.9  17.9 
2.00 – 4.99  34.9  35.3 
5.00 – 9.99  29.8  29.6 
10.00 – 14.99  11.3  11.2 
15  ha and more  6.1  6.0 
Average total farm area (ha)  7.2  7.1 
Tractors per 100 ha of agricultural land (units)  6.9  7.2 
Consumption of artificial fertilizers in terms of pure ingredients 
per 1 ha of agricultural land (kg) 
168  61 
Protein feed sales per large head (dt)  3.0  1.9 
Yields of basic cereals per ha (dt)  32.7  27.0 
Production of milk per cow (l)  3 156  3 024 
Price relations (“price gap”) of sold agricultural products to 
goods and services purchased by private farms (1990=100) 
125.6  84.0 
Agricultural income  (1989=100)  100  43 
Source: GUS, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 1990, 1991, 1994 
To sum up the balance of entry of agriculture into market economy was not advantageous.  
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The first effects of the market economy for agriculture 
   
In 1990, the economic environment has changed significantly for Polish farmer. Introduction of 
market reforms with elimination most farms and food subsides (including subsidies to credits), free 
import, privatization of state or cooperative enterprises in food sector, floating market demand and 
unstable prices did rapidly the conducting operations more difficult than before.  Farmers faced strong 
competition on market and new production requirements. In planned economy they were expected 
only to produce. In market economy the skills to sell and to be paid became very important. These 
changes resulted in a significant decrease in agricultural incomes. In real terms they fell down by 
51.4% in 1990 and by 26.1% in the next year. In 1992 and 1993 slight increase was noticed so at the 
end of 1993 the incomes were about 57% lower comparing with 1989. What more, the very many 
part-time farmers lost their job outside the farms.  The sharp and deep reduction of incomes and 
widening “price gap” (Table 2) influenced the level of farmers’ expenditures for working capital and 
investments. The same time access to external sources of capital, namely credits were limited because 
of very high interest rates. As a result, demand for inputs (fertilisers, pesticides and seeds) decreased 
significantly as well as investments. The effects of this reduction appeared very quickly (Table 2).  
 
The initial credit intervention 
 
After introduction of market reforms at the beginning of 1990 the signals about worsening 
situation of agriculture and dissatisfactions of farmers appeared. More over in 1992 a severe natural 
disaster, which the agriculture is specially exposed and sensitive for, took place. As a remedy the 
Governments, no matter of what political option (the governments were changed several times during 
the first five years of transformation) did use credits as a tool of intervention. These credits can be 
divided into three groups in respect of aim: (i) so called “spring credits” or “fertilizers credits”, (ii) so 
called “draught credits” and (iii) investment credits.  
“Spring credits” were established rather very quickly after introduction of rules of market 
economy because in April 1990. They were designed only for one year and could be used for 
financing of purchase of working capital (seeds, fertiliser, pesticides, protein feed, etc.) and land. But 
every next year in spring the government repeated the preferential credit offer. The range of credit 
targets were widened gradually. Additionally credits for buyers of agricultural products were allowed. 
The preferential character of these credits relied upon the lower then market interest rate. The farmers 
paid only a part of market price. The size of interest rate paid by farmers was connected with central 
bank refinancing credit rate (except 1990 when it was described at fixed level). Until 1995 the 
government every year issued new ordinance to establish credit of this kind. The Ministry of 
Agriculture proposed the list of preferential targets and Ministry of Finance was responsible for 
settling account with banks. 
To reduce the effects of the severe draught in the summer 1992 (comparing with 1991 the 
production of basic cereals felt down about 27,9%, potatoes -19.4%, vegetable – 20.5%, surge beat – 
26.8%) the Council of Ministers decided in November to use the preferential credits. The terms of 
them were more favourable than “spring credits” in respect to the interest rate and the other terms too. 
In 1994 the draught appeared again so the government used the “draught credits” again.   
The “spring” and “draught credits” could finance the chosen investments in farms, at the 
beginning land, later tractors or the other farm equipment. In 1991 in state budget about 30 millions 
USD was devoted for subsidies to credits for modernisation and restructuring agriculture and food 
industry. In 1992 the attempt was made to solve institutionally the problem of agricultural debt and the 
support the process of restructuring and modernisation. The Fund for Restructuring and Debt 
Reduction in Agriculture (FRiOR) was established. It is worth to mention that this time the leader of 
the Polish Farmers Party was the Prime Minster. At the same time the similar agencies were 
established in Hungary, Slovakia (Chrastinova, 1999; Silar and Doucha, 1999; Ulrich, 1999).  Priority 
was given to farmers, who wanted to restructure their debt. Credits were granted by banks on the 
ground the funds of Fund. Smaller credits were allowed by banks independently, bigger ones after 
acceptance of Fund. Banks took the commission for intermediation. The terms for borrowers were 
very favourable comparing with market terms. For example the interest rate of credits for new 
investments was at 20% whereas the central bank refinancing rate was at 38% in the second half of   5 
the1992. Luck of financial responsibility by banks caused that they were not very careful about the 
aims of credits, efficiency of planned investments or collaterals by granting credits. The Fund had 
worked for only one year. In July 1993 after the total critics it was suspended from activity for two 
months. In 1994 the new state agency replaced it and undertook its obligations. 
The effects of all presented kinds of credits were rather small. The values of granted credits were 
not high. In the case of “spring credits” most of the subsidies were used not by farmers but by 
enterprises which bought agricultural products  
 
The creation the system of credit support of the agriculture  
 
The first economic effects of implementation of market economy were not positive for creation 
preconditions for future modernisation and restructuring of agriculture. The several years of decrease 
in investments and lack of changes in farm structure (Table 2), especially in the context of the 
intention to join the European Union formally expressed in Athens 8 April 1994 by official application 
for membership in the UE, mobilized the government to start to create a stable system of support of 
restructuring and modernisation of the agriculture. The credit was chosen as a main tool to achieve 
these goals. To realize the credit policy in agriculture the state agency –  TheAgency for Restructuring 
and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARMA) was established in the end of 2003 as the main leading 
element of credit support system. It is the typical way in Poland to sort out the economic problems in 
the way of forming the state agencies. At the beginning of transition the two state agencies were set up 
in the sector of agriculture – The Agency for Agricultural Markets (1990), The Agency of State Real 
Estate in Agriculture (1991). Banks and the Advisory Centres for Agriculture were the other elements 
of that system. 
 
Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture 
 
As aforementioned the ARMA replaced the FRiOR and took its responsibilities. The negative 
experiences with the FRiOR were taken under consideration in creation its targets, scope and forms of 
activity so it did not follow the FRiOR at all. The ARMA was established by The Act of Parliament in 
December 1993.  
The official aims of Agency at the beginning were: 
-  to support investments in agriculture, food industry and firms providing services to 
agriculture; 
-   to improve the agrarian structure;  
-  to provide financial assistance to programs (investors) creating new non-farming jobs in rural 
areas; 
-  to develop rural infrastructure; 
-  to support the education, information and advisor initiatives; 
-  others.  
In the following years the scope of aims were widened.  
The Agency executes its tasks through:  
-  subsidies to interest on credits granted by banks; 
-  financing or co-financing particular projects; 
-  bank guarantees and collateral security for bank credits and loans.  
The Agency activity is mainly financed by state budget. The interest on bank deposits, credits, 




The banks that are interested in granting preferential credits sign contracts with the ARMA about 
realization of granting subsidised credits, or guarantees. The contracts precise terms of credits, 
procedures, rules of control, limits of subsidies for their disposal. Banks allow credits from their own 
resources on their own risk. Banks grant preferential credits in the framework of so called lines of 
credits, which differ by purpose, borrowers and the level of subsidies. Number of this investment   6 
credits lines was changed nearly every year from 4 ones at the beginning to 46 ones in the end of 
1997. Many branch credits lines and all regional credits lines of rather small importance were shut in 
1998 (for example during three years of working of regional credit lines in the frame of 27 of these 
lines only 1007 credits were allowed). At the end of 2003 credits from 15 investment credit lines were 
available. The most important and popular lines have worked since 1995 continuously up today. In 
1995 28 commercial banks except cooperative banks cooperated with agency, 10 years later - 22 ones.  
 
The Advisory Centres for Agriculture 
 
The Advisory Centres for Agriculture (ACA) are responsible for the financial and formal 
evaluation of the investment projects that farmers want to realize and to finance with subsidised 
credits. The ACA are obliged to do this gratis. To evaluate the project the Centres request different 
documents especially business plan. The Centres’ officers check the realisation of the larger 
investment projects. It is important activity in the light that banks are generally interested in punctual 
repayment of credits and may not pay enough attention to declared aim of using of the subsidised 
credit by the lender. 
 
The regulation of credit support system 
 
The scope, targets and forms of agency activity are regulated by the Acts of Parliament. The 
terms of credit support are ruled by the Ordinances of Council of Ministers and Regulations of The 
President of the ARMA. They describe kinds of investment credit lines and the terms of the credits for 
farmers or the other economic agents and for banks. 
In 1995 the problem of “spring credits” were regulated by The Act of Parliament which stopped 
every year uncertainty and stabilized terms of them. The administration of these credits was given to 
the ARMA on the base of the agreement between The Ministry of Agriculture and the ARMA.   
The elements of support system and the relations between them are presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The schema of credit support system in Poland 
 
The system of credit support can be estimated as not complicated and rather clear. The way to 
obtain a credit by farmer is the same as in the  case of commercial credits with one aforementioned 
exception – the positive opinion of Advisory Centre about the purposefulness of the investment is 
required additionally. It of course increases the cost of applying a credit.      7 
The terms of the  preferential credits 
 
The terms of credits are advantageous for farmers in comparison with commercial terms of 
credits (Table 3). It is expressed generally by lower interest rate, longer maturity and the grace period. 
Generally central bank discount rate is the benchmark for interest rate paid by farmers. It is a 
result of subtraction the interest rate required by bank and the maximum level of interest rate 
subsidised by the ARMA.  
 
Table 3. The main terms of preferential credits offered by banks to farmers in the frame of the main 
credit lines in 2003 (31 December) 







contribution in the 






1/2 of bank interest 
rate 
min 3% 
2  20-30  8 
Credits for land 
purchasing 
1/4 of central bank 
discount rate 
min 1.2% 
2  20-30  15 
Credits to young 
farmers 
1/4 of central bank 
discount rate 
min. 1.2% 
2  20-30  15 
Branch credits  0.75 x 1.3 Polish  
Central Bank 
discount rate  
min 2% 
2  20-30  8-15 
Credits for working 
capital 
0,35 of the central 
bank discount rate 
min 2% 
-  -  1 - 2 
Source: Own comparison based on Ordering of Council of Ministers and The Regulation of The President of the 
ARMA 
  To prevent the high interest rates charged by banks, the maximum interest rate on preferential 
credits is established. It is connected with central bank discount rate too. The multiplier using to 
investment credits was changed several time and ranged from 1.5 to 1.25. Since the end of September 
2003 it has been 1.3.  
In the case of investment credits, the period of maturity is very important. In the circumstances of 
inflation, low profitability and high risk the banks do not want to allow credits for long period so the 
8-15 years of repayment of preferential credits can be treated as a big advantage of these credits. This 
remark concerns to grace period too. The farmers ought to have their own contribution in financing the 
investment. Its level depends on kind of credit target. What more the maximum level of the value of 
the  preferential  credits  was  established  -PLN  4  millions  (about  EUR  1  million)  in  the  case  of 
investment credits and amount money equal of value of 10 dt of ray for every 1 ha of agricultural land 
own or leased in the case of credits for working capital. 
  The very important mechanism to prevent farmers from using the credit not according to declared 
target was introduced. Farmers who used credits in the improper way have to pay subsidies back. 
Another regulation concerns repayment credit in time: those who delay with repayment, lose the right 
to preferential interest rate. It resolved the very important problem of reimbursement often mentioned 
in the literature (Yanbykh, 2001; Von Pischke, 2001; Van Empel, 2001). As data shows the farmers 
are  very  reliable  debtors.  The  share  of  irregular  claims  in  the  debts  of  individual  farmers  in 
cooperative banks was in 2003 at 3% level in the next year decreased to 2% (Summary Evaluation 
2004, 2005). 
   8 
The scale and the effects of 10 years performance of credit support system 
 
The evaluation of the effects of the credit support system is not easy because of their vast range 
dimensions: economic, social and political and many economic agents involving in that system. The 
scale of support, its influence on agricultural indicators and the cost of running the system must be 
taken under consideration. 
 
The scale of the credit assistance 
 
During the period 1994-2003 every year some ten thousand of farms (a very few percent of 
existing farms, or even farms that produce mainly for sale) took the investment credits and some 
hundred thousand of them borrowed money for working capital (Table 4). The number of credits 
varied from year to year. The highest interest of farmers was at the beginning of the preferential credit 
system. At the end of the 90s the number of credits decreased noticeably. In new decade the number of 
investment credits increased but did not reached the level from the beginning. This fall of using credits 
especially investment ones can be connected with the recession in the Polish economy. It seems that 
the agricultural credit is very sensitive about macroeconomic situation, which determines the global 
demand and influences the perspective perception (Danilowska 2004). In Poland the level of using 
bank agricultural credits is generally low. The investigation of The World Bank about the rural credit 
market in Poland gives two explanations for the low levels of borrowing among the rural Polish 
households (Report No. 22598-POL 2001). The first one is the “uncertainty hypothesis” underlying 
the role of stable and predictable economic environment; the second is “credit market hypothesis” 
indicating imperfections in the banking system. The findings of the World Bank investigation showed 
that the first hypothesis is more consistent with the “uncertainty hypothesis”. The role of 
macroeconomic incentives is underlined by Kowalski (1999) and Kulawik (2001). The author’s 
investigation (the investigation made in frame of university grant 504 08020011 “The microeconomic 
determinants of agricultural credits in Poland”) on microeconomic determinants of taking bank credits 
by farmers,  which were examined systematically by the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics, 
showed rather small or even not important role of such determinants as age, education, farm area, the 
scale of investment, output, income, the non-farming activity, being a shareholders of cooperative 
bank. The findings can suggest implicitly the leading role of macroeconomic determinants in 
undertaking decisions about using bank credits. 
 
Table 4. The number and structure of subsidized credits for farms in Poland in 1994-2003 
Year  Investment credits
1,2   Branch credits  Credits for working 
capital 
Credits due to 
natural disasters 
  Number  %  Number  %  Number  %  Number  % 
1994  15 850  7.0  81  0.4  400 000  9.3  339 860  41.7 
1995  29 908  11.3  3 438  19.1  311 437  7.3  170 421  20.9 
1996  53 840  20.3  3 977  22.1  667 761  15.6  2 600  0,3 
1997  50 592  19.0  3 597  20.0  593 736  13.9  23 959  2.9 
1998  15 990  6.0  1 133  6.3  460 086  10.7  11 709  1.4 
1999  18 430  6.9  1 446  8.0  457 964  10.7  17 893  2.2 
2000  14 112  5.3  1 528  8.5  348 110  8.1  134 629  16.5 
2001  18 517  7.0  755  4.2  351 026  8.2  21 628  2.7 
2001  24 012  9.0  1 126  6.2  354 107  8.3  22 711  2.8 
2003  24 570  9.2  941  5.2  340 509  7.9  70 554  8.6 
Total  265 821  100  18 022  100  4 284 736  100  815 964  100 
Notes: 
1 Investment credits: Basic investment credits, Credits for land purchase, Credits to young farmers, 
Investment credits for farms suffered from natural disasters, Credits for set up or increase of production 
2 excluding credits for investments in food industry         
Source: Own calculations based on: data from Kredyty preferencyjne “wiosenne” 1994 r., Sekcja Analiz 
Ekonomicznych Polityki Rolnej, FAPA, Nr 5/94, Warszawa 20.10.1994, Annual Reports on Activity of 
the ARMA (1994-2003), ARMA 1995-2004   9 
Assuming that for average farm using the preferential investment credits 1.4 preferential credit 
(the effect of authors investigation on the base of survey made on sample of 86 farms which were 
examined systematically by the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics and were in debt due to 
preferential investment credits on 31 December 2001) was devolved it can be estimated that about 
10% farms were beneficiaries of that kind of assistance during 10 years of running credit support 
system. More over every year about 20-30% of farms took credits for working capital 
 
The place of the agriculture in the economy and the effects of 10 years of the  credit support 
system performance 
 
During 10 years (1994-2003) the place of the agriculture in the Polish economy compared with 
1993 has changed noticeably. The share of agriculture in GDP decreased nearly 3 times, the 
employment in that sector went down about 40%, the export of agricultural product raised about 40%, 
the share of in investment outlays decreased. But those processes were generally an effect of 
transformation of the whole economy, which developed rather quickly especially in the mid of 
nineties.  
 
Table 5. The place of agriculture in the Polish economy at the end of 2003 
Specifications  2003  2003 
1993=100 
Population in rural areas (% of total)  38.4  100.5 
Persons employed in agriculture and hunting   (%)  16,1  62.6 
GDP in agriculture, hunting and forestry (%)  2,6  40.6 
Agricultural land area  (' 000 ha) 





Share  of  agriculture,  hunting  and  forestry  in  total  investment 
outlays (%) 
2,0  29.4 
Share of live animals, animal and vegetable products in export (%)  4.8  141.2 
Source: GUS, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 1990, 1991, 1994, 2004 
 
The changes inside of the agricultural sector took place too. Of course they resulted from many 
factors not only credits. After 10 years of running credit support system in agriculture the changes in 
number of farms and in area structure appeared. The decrease in the number of farms is rather positive 
sign, but changes in farms’ structure can not be evaluated positivly, because the number of the 
smallest farms increased very much, whereas the decline in the number of larger farms was observed 
with one positive exception – the group of the largest farm with the share of 9.9%. The nearly 10 
percentage of number of farms in Poland means about 185 thousand of large farms. These farms have 
a big production capacity. 
Table 6. The major economic and production results in the Polish agriculture in 2003 
Specifications  2003  2003 
1993=100 
Private farms exceeding 1 ha of agricultural land   1,850,000  86.1 
Farms structure by area of agricultural land (%)  100  - 
1.01 – 1.99  25.8  144.1 
2.00 – 4.99  33.0  93.8 
5.00 – 9.99  22.1  74.7 
10.00 – 14.99  9.2  82.1 
15  ha and more  9.9  159.7   10 
Average total farm area (ha)  8.2  115.5 
Tractors per 100 ha of agricultural land (units)  8.5  118.1 
Consumption of artificial fertilizers in terms of pure ingredients per 
1 ha of agricultural land (kg) 
93.6  153.4 
Yields of basic cereals per ha (dt)  28.3  104.8 
Production of milk per cow (l)  3 969  131.2 
Price relations (“price gap”) of sold agricultural products to goods 
and services purchased by private farms 1990=100 
63.9  76.1 
Source: GUS, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 1990, 1991, 1994, 2004 and own 
calculation on these data 
The  findings  of  Petrick  indicate  that  the  Polish  farmers  make  their  investment  decisions 
conditional on the availability of subsidised credits (2004). The undertaken investment influenced 
technology of production and the results. The productivity of the agricultural activity in 2003 was 
better comparing with 1993. However, it is very difficult to estimate the role of preferential credits in 
these phenomena. 
The effect of credit system for the agricultural credit market 
The  quite  easy  access  to  credit  and  vast  range  of  preferential  credits  targets  caused  nearly 
replacing the commercial credits by preferential credits. During examined period the share of farmers’ 
banking debt due to preferential credits in banking farmers debt was increasing and in December 2003 
was amounted at about 85% (Table 7). Author’s investigation done on farms, which were examined 
systematically by the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics showed that about 21.4% analysed 
credits were taken on commercial terms and  about 40% of the latter were used for financing the 
purchase of car. 
Table 7. The structure of farmers’ debt in the banking sector, by classification (December 31) 
Banks 
 
Farmers’ debt due 
to preferential 
credits in total 
farmers’ debt in 
the particular 
group of banks 
(%) 
Farmers’ debt in 
total debt of non-
financial sector in 
the particular 
group of banks 
(%) 
Farmers’ debt due 
to preferential 
credits in total 
debt of non-
financial sector in 
the particular 

































Total  79.9  84.5  85.4  4.0  4.4  4.4  3.2  3.7  3.8  100  100  100 
Cooperative banks  81.0  82.0  80.4  40.6  42.5  4.8  32.9  34.8  35.2  50.3  54.6  66.6 
Commercial banks 
(without regional and 
affiliating)
1 
77.9  76.9  96.0  1.1  0.9  1.2  0.9  0.7  1.2  25.1  17.8  26.0 
Regional and 
affiliating banks 
79.7  94.4  93.0  16.3  23.5  33.3  12.9  22.2  30.9  24.6  27.6  7.4 
1 Since 2002 the Food Bank (Bank Gospodarki ￿ywno￿ciowej) is not classified as affiliating bank and it was 
reflected in the data for 2003 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Bilansowe wyniki finansowe banków w 1999, 2001, 2003, GUS, 
Warszawa 2000, 2002, 2004. 
 
The other phenomenon of a very great importance is the role of agricultural preferential credits in 
creating stable financial system for rural areas. At the beginning of transition only the network of   11 
cooperative banks serviced agents in the rural areas. The commercial banks focused on developing 
their network in the urban areas. It the second half of the 90s it seemed that they were interested in 
service of the  rural areas and granting credits to farmers, but in the new decade, as data show, their 
share in farmers debt decreased noticeably, what’s more the number of their different kinds offices 
declined from 11 470 in 2000 to 8 359 in 2004 (about 27%) (Summary.., 2005). These data indicate 
the fall of the role of the commercial banks in the rural areas. In the first half of the 90s the situation of 
cooperative banks was worsening quickly for many reasons (Swinnen 1998; Van Empel, 1999)) and 
many banks bankrupted (Danilowska 2004). The restructuring of the sector of cooperative banks, 
which has taken place since 1994, probably would not have been finished successfully without 
preferential credits for farmers and for food enterprises. Farmers’ credit demand especially at the 
beginning of transition was rather small (Danilowska 2004). The credits subsidies increased farmers’ 
credit demand. The allowed credits became than the revenues of different kind of enterprises operating 
in the rural areas and having their accounts in the cooperative banks. The role of preferential credits 
for the cooperative banks is illustrated by data in Table 7. The well developed network of offices of 
the cooperative banks (3 383 different kind of office in the end of 2004) not only meets demand for 
financial services in rural areas but decreases transaction costs of the credit contracts in many ways as 
well, for example for banks by having credit history of farms often from communistic period, for 
farmers by lowering of the travel costs to arrange the credit. Without cooperative banks the access of 
many people living in rural areas would have been more difficult and the transaction cost of many 
financial services would have been very high. The different processes (among them preferential credit 
system) resulted the stable well functioning system of cooperative banks providing financial services 
for economic agents in the rural areas. 
 
The cost of running credit support system in the agriculture 
   
  The running the credit support system requires the every year budget expenditures. They depend  
on the number of credits, the period of credit maturities, the height of interest rates in the economy and 
the way of describing the height of the interest rate for banks and farmers (enterprises) .    
Table 8. The expenditures for financing of preferential agricultural credits in 1995 -2003 
Specification  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Expenditures due to subsidies to 
interest on preferential agricultural 
investment credits – indices, previous 
year =100 
-  218.9  151.9  107.9  86.2  111.3  97.7  69.8  63.9 
Expenditures due to subsidies to 
interest on preferential agricultural 
credit for working capital – indices, 
previous year =100 
-  139.0  114.5  73.6  58.2  141.7  41.8  97.5  37.0 
Relation of expenditures for 




















Relation of expenditures due to 
subsidies to interest on preferential 
agricultural credit (for the whole 
investment, current means of 
production and purchase of 
agricultural products) to state budget 
expenditures for agriculture (%) 
30.1  43.2  59.9  58.2  45.0  56.3  45.7  32.3  15.8 
Relation of expenditures due to 
subsidies to interest on preferential 
agricultural credit (for the whole 
investment, current means of 
production and purchase of 
0.48  0.79  1.05  0.98  0.77  0.92  0.81  0.54  0.30   12 
agricultural products) to state budget 
expenditures (%) 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Annual Reports on Law on Public Finances and Annual Reports 
on Activity of the ARMA (1995-2002). 
 
At the beginning of the working of the credit support system the widening preferential credit 
offer and accumulation of debts caused the quick increase of subsidies. On the other hand at the same 
time the central bank discount rate was going down, which slowed the growth of the subsidies. In 
1998 and 1999 the subsides declined noticeably because of a deep and rapid fall in the number of 
allowed credits, further decrease of central bank discount rate and aforementioned reduction of the 
multiplier that describes the maximum level of the bank interest rates on preferential credits. Next year 
the subsidies rose as an effect of an increase of the central bank discount rate but since the 2001 this 
rate has been going down so the subsidies have been falling too. 
The relations of the credit subsidies to budget expenditures for agriculture in examined period at 
even 60% level indicate that the credit was leading tool of state intervention in agriculture. Since 2000 
it has fallen deeply as the other tools were implemented mainly subsidies in the frame of different 
programs in agriculture for example coo-financing investments done in the frame of SAPARD or  the 
program of the afforesting of agricultural land.  
The credit subsidies compared to state budget expenditures show the scale of the credit assistance 
from the perspective of the economy. It can be evaluated as of noticeably meaning in the 90s and of a 
decreasing importance in the new decade.  
The tendencies in the value of credit subsidies prove that the credit support system is losing 
gradually its significance in financing the Polish agriculture. The farmers don’t protest against, as new 
even more favourable financial tools of intervention are introduced in the frame of many programs -




  The credit support system is addressed mainly to the farmers and in a smaller part to the food 
enterprises. These economic agents are obvious beneficiaries of that system, but they are not alone 
ones. There is a quite long list of other beneficiaries, who take advantages in different ways and forms. 
The list includes banks, especially cooperative banks, inhabitants of rural areas, producers and sellers 
of the means of production, the staff of ARMA and the Agricultural Advisory Centres and of course 
politicians. 
  Banks derive profits from the credit support system in the form of the increase of farmers credit 
demand. They get the whole subsidies. What’s more, the state by regulation of repayment the 
preferential credits and financing the Agricultural Advisory Centres that evaluate investment project 
lowers banks’ risk and costs. It is worth to underline that the cooperative banks are the especially 
beneficiaries of the examined system. Credit subsidies helped cooperative banks to overcome the 
difficulties connected with the transformation through creating credit demand. In result of that and 
other incentives the sustainable financial system in the rural areas was established. That system 
services the people in the rural areas, gives  them the easy and quick access to financial services at 
reasonable cost.  
The producers and sellers of the means of production and investment goods take the advantage 
from the system because subsidies increases the credit demand and in result demand for working and 
fixed capital.  
The staff of the Agency and the Advisory Centres is a beneficiary too, as the officers have a 
stable job in the state organisations, what in the country with the very high unemployment rate is very 
valuable. 
Politicians are the group especially interested in credit support because credit is a very flexible 
and comfortable tool,  suitable for quick using in different situations. The every political party that 
formed governments during analysed period used the preferential credits as a tool of a gain of farmers 
acceptance. 
The mentioned agents can be described as a winners of the credit support system in the Polish 
agriculture.    13 
In the contrary to the list of beneficiaries, the list of losers is rather short. There are only two 
groups on it. The taxpayers are the first but very large group of losers, as the credit subsidies are paid 
from the state budget. It is worth to mention that the Polish farmers don’t pay income tax. The second 
group includes the farmers, who have to pay the higher prices for the means of agricultural production 
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